A lot has happened since the Soviets began tying their submarines to the pier instead of operating off the coasts of America. We have evolved into a generation that can safely sit in our living rooms to watch the precision Nintendo-like strikes of our Naval Aviation assets on CNN. Life is pretty good.
At a time when there seems to be no world power capable of challenging our might, technology has progressed to the point where we are launching single aircraft against several targets, and not vice versa. The combination of a perceived opportunity to reduce force structure coupled with startling improvements in our warfighting technology has greatly improved our Naval Aviation effectiveness. At the same time, it has opened the door for serious discussions aimed at downsizing our forces.
The need for a powerful active and Reserve aviation structure during the Cold War was never questioned. The thought of fighting a worldwide conflict with a powerful nuclear-capable enemy drove the demand for a large force structure that was capable and active, along with a large, ready Reserve force to sustain the war. It seems that in the 1990s we declared victory on our traditional foe and focused instead on smaller contingencies that could be quickly resolved and would require less force structure.
It is this shift in philosophy that drives our current deliberations for building the 21st century Naval Air Reserve Force. As Yogi Berra once said, “The future just ain’t what it used to be.” A quick review of the transformation of the Naval Air Reserve is helpful in determining where we are today and where we are headed in the future.
Our Mission
The mission of the Navy has always been to provide prompt and sustained Naval power in support of our national objectives. In the Cold War model, our active forces executed the prompt part of our mission — and the sustained part became the task of our Reserve forces. While the active Navy operated at sea, the Naval Air Reserve trained for World War III mobilization. The result was two nearly separate forces, one active and one in reserve. The Naval Air Reserve force trained autonomously, had their own funding streams and leadership, even had their own way of doing business accompanied by a distinct culture that developed insidiously over time.
Department of Defense initiatives to build a “Total Force” of active and Reserve assets began in the 1970s. These initiatives gained momentum in the 1980s under Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s “horizontal integration” program to outfit active and reserve squadrons with similar equipment to ensure their interoperability. Despite this, there was little contact between the two forces — the active Navy deployed and operated while the Naval Reserve trained amongst themselves and developed the “weekend warrior” culture that increasingly separated them from their active counterparts.
With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the downsizing of active Naval Aviation forces caused a reevaluation of the use of Reserve Aviation forces. As the active force structure continued to dwindle in the ’90s with no decrease in commitments, the active Navy began to look to the Reserves for assistance. The concept of “peacetime contributory support” was spawned, and the integration of the two Navies began taking shape.
Today our Naval Reserve Aviation forces are totally focused on helping Navy accomplish their day-to-day mission as well as being ready for mobilization. For example, Carrier Reserve Air Wing 20 is assisting the fleet with adversary training and drug enforcement. As I write this, it is preparing to deploy its EA-6B squadron to Operation Northern Watch.
When the Navy needed an air wing to ride USS Nimitz (CVN-68) around Cape Horn to its new port in San Diego, CVWR-20 mustered, integrated an active VS squadron and COD assets, and got the job done. I could list many more success stories, because in each Naval Air Reserve community we are in constant contact with our active-duty counterparts to support their requirements.
As the pressure to update our aircraft builds, hard decisions need to be made concerning future capabilities of our force. One thing is certain — we will maintain the capable mobilization force that Congress mandates, supporting the active forces to meet all requirements.
Force Structure
The force structure debate is well under way, and we have seen a precipitous reduction during the last decade. Within the Naval Air Reserve, we have lost 50 percent of our tactical air structure with the deactivation of one of our two carrier reserve air wings. Other communities have seen similar reductions in both active and reserve forces. The previous structure, capable of supporting forward-deployed operations of our Navy, also carried with it the ability to react to emerging crises. That capability is gone, and it appears we are in the fight of our lives just to maintain what is required to forward deploy our carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. As the recapitalization needs conflict with budget realities (and yes, that time has arrived), the Navy is forced to support those that forward deploy as a first priority.
That makes sense, as we must always fund the core business of Naval Aviation first. That being said, if forces are not in the regular deployment rotation, they risk a lower priority for equipment upgrade. The Naval Air Reserve Force is finding itself in the cross hairs of this discussion. While the capability to mobilize and deploy the Reserve CVWR should never be doubted, without funding to buy modern equipment for the future and the resolve of Naval leadership to ensure proper funding support, the future of CVWR-20 as a deployable asset is in question.
The very concept of maintaining a Reserve air wing as a mobilization asset is being studied and the force structure for our future TacAir assets in the Reserve Force is under review. If the decision is made to keep CVWR-20 as the Navy’s 11th air wing, funding support must proceed. If the final decision is to reduce the Reserve Force still further by not maintaining this capability, some squadrons will remain as fleet support units. Personnel from other squadrons will be restructured to augment forces for regular Navy squadrons.
The Future
The missions our Navy wants the Naval Air Reserve Force to execute will be the driving force in determining our future structure. During the past year, the Naval Air Reserve has been restructured for better support of our Training Command requirements. Significant increases in TAR and Selected Reservist manning in squadrons of the Training Command has corrected the historical shortage of Training Command instructors. Future increases in Reserve fleet replacement squadron manning will support a similar mission requirement. As our Naval Air Reserve becomes more integrated with our active forces, the result is better mission accomplishment and readiness for our Naval forces. The ongoing community-by-community deliberations must drive to the most effective utilization of our Reserve assets to support the Navy’s mission, not just on “mob-day” (mobilization day), but in the daily execution of our Navy’s missions.
In some cases, continuing with Reserve squadrons and wings offer the best solution to maintain capabilities in standby at reduced costs, to be available when called on. In others, a shifting of Reserve officer and enlisted personnel to active units to augment squadron operations makes more sense.
In the end, we must take a long-term view in solving this problem, structure our forces for the future and not make just budget-based decisions. I realize this is easier said than done, but the future success of our Naval Air Reserve and its role in Naval Aviation is at stake, and the formation of the next generation of Naval Air Reserve Force missions and force structure will be determined by the decisions made now.
Ed. Note: RADM McLaughlin, a 1972 Naval Academy graduate, was designated a Naval Aviator in 1975, received orders to HC-3 and later was a plankowner in HC-11. Following redesignation as a TAR in the Naval Reserve, McLaughlin was assigned to a variety of billets within the Reserve community, including command of HSL-94 and NAS JRB New Orleans. Attaining flag rank in 1999, he was assigned as Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force and in July 2002, assumed command of Naval Reserve Forces with headquarters in New Orleans.