The Navy’s New Operational Construct

by ADM William J. Fallon, USN
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command

During the period between Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, three factors combined to alter the way we train and deploy the majority of our Naval Forces.

First, the ongoing global War on Terror mandated that we re-examine our thinking in terms of how we prepare for deployment and sustain our Naval Forces as the nation engaged in a protracted war.

Second, in the buildup to combat operations in the skies over Iraq, the Navy needed to orchestrate the deployment of more than half of its carrier force in order to provide the President and Secretary of Defense real warfighting options when access to facilities ashore in the Middle East became problematic.

Third, as the 2004 budget was being discussed in the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked why he should consider investing in a new aircraft carrier when the nation was getting only a 25 percent deployed usage rate out of these expensive capital assets — six out of 24 months in a training/deployment cycle.

A Defining Moment in Naval Aviation

Just over a year ago the Navy simultaneously deployed seven aircraft carriers and nine “big deck” assault ships in support of Iraqi Freedom. Carriers USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), Constellation (CV-64) and Kitty Hawk (CV-63) were operating in the Persian Gulf. Aircraft from Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) flew from the Mediterranean Sea. In the western Pacific Ocean, Carl Vinson (CVN-70) took up station in the absence of Kitty Hawk. Meanwhile, Nimitz (CVN-68) was steaming toward the Arabian Gulf to relieve Abraham Lincoln.

Unquestionably, it was a defining moment in Naval Aviation history, made all the more remarkable given the deployment of Kitty Hawk, Roosevelt and Enterprise (CVN-65), just the year before in support of Enduring Freedom. Moreover, the deployment of 182 ships of all types between January and May of 2003 powerfully demonstrated the ability of the U.S. Navy to surge combat power forward.

Following this deployment came the daunting task of recocking the force to maintain our commitments around the world and to continue to engage the enemy in the global War on Terror. Just as our sailors and ships executed smartly during the war, our shipyards and shore commands performed superbly in readying the force for all future challenges.

This experience taught us that in today’s demanding and uncertain operational environment, carriers and air wings can no longer train to a constant drumbeat and a lock-step plan in preparing for deployment. This methodology simply does not support a large number of surge assets ready in a national emergency.

A Fundamental Change in Thinking

Today’s operational environment requires a fundamental change in the way we maintain fleet readiness throughout the year. In addition to presence and engagement in forward areas, we must think in terms of our ability to surge — to be ready to respond as we did in support of Iraqi Freedom.

In developing the ability to surge, fleet and type commanders have been hard at work implementing and refining the Navy’s new operational construct, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) or, as we call it in the fleet, the Fleet Readiness Program, given our focus on readiness and the fact that we are institutionalizing the plan.

Born of the desire to rapidly deploy more than one carrier strike group (CSG) from ConUS on short notice in order to increase Navy combat power overseas, FRP enables a flexible, scalable and rapidly deployable force while continuing to prepare for rotational deployments in support of global force presence. FRP is designed to more rapidly develop, then sustain targeted readiness aboard our ships and in squadrons and air wings by adjusting necessary training and, in some cases, accelerating certifications and schedules. It requires us to rethink how we maintain our ships and aircraft between deployments without spending more money for readiness and maintenance or placing additional burdens on the shoulders of our sailors.

A key aspect of FRP is the notion of targeted readiness rather than assuming a requirement to aim for the highest readiness levels. In many instances, absent indications of imminent danger, intermediate levels of readiness are not only acceptable but prudent uses of resources.

Creating a Flexible Deterrence

Importantly, without a crisis or contingency operation, FRP does not mean increased operational tempo or time away from home. While Naval forces will be required to operate differently and have a greater number of units ready for deployment, this does not mean they will operate more often, deploy sooner or deploy without notice.

By expanding the number of ships available for operations, we enable our Navy to posture itself better to support combatant commanders with the capabilities they might need, while at the same time retaining the ability to provide the President flexible deterrent options on short notice.

Under FRP, our goal as a warfighting Navy is to be able to provide the nation “six-plus-two” ready CSGs; specifically, six CSGs deployed or ready to deploy within 30 days and two others ready to go within approximately 90 days. Navy leadership will review this six-plus-two CSG goal periodically, with adjustments made in response to the geopolitical situation.

Maintaining a robust surge capability requires a new methodology to handle manning, maintenance, training and readiness. The Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP), a 27-month cycle that includes four phases prior to deployment (maintenance, unit level training, integrated training and sustainment), supersedes the Interdeployment Training Cycle (IDTC).

Under the FRTP, a maintenance phase, which varies from nine weeks for surface combatants to 10 months for aircraft carriers, is followed by a period of unit-level training to achieve a level of readiness appropriate to the CSG being considered “emergency surgeable.”

Key concepts in these phases of the FRTP are “continuous maintenance” for ships as an alternative to concentrated shipyard availabilities and the business of basic training and certifications, the responsibility of the type commanders. The idea is to have the major prerequisites for surge deployment (manning, maintenance and key training) completed so that additional tailored training appropriate to the geopolitical situation can be expeditiously completed.

The integrated phase of training is tailored to individual ship and air wing strengths and weaknesses, and concludes with the Composite Training Underway Exercise (CompTUEx) and carrier air wing strike training at NAS Fallon. Once complete, the CSG would then be considered “surge ready,” meaning it could deploy on short notice.

The sustainment phase of the FRTP consists of a variety of training evolutions designed to maintain a CSG’s readiness until it actually deploys, and might include a Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEx).

Length of deployments under the FRP will depend on the needs of the combatant commanders, and except when required for contingency operations, will rarely exceed six months. There could be some shorter deployments and demonstrations of surge capability, but the goal of the FRP is to put in place an ability to surge significant combat power on short notice, if required.

Presence With a Purpose

Additionally, as we retool our training and deployment construct, we’re working to meet the CNO goal of “presence with a purpose,” employing CSGs in support of well-defined missions rather than deploying merely for the sake of maintaining a presence. CNO wants a Navy that is able to rapidly respond with very significant combat power. Six-month heel-to-toe deployments just to provide presence somewhere limit available response options and make us predictable to potential adversaries.

We want the ability to provide the President with scalable options up to eight carriers if required to get the job done. FRP and its associated FRTP are designed to give CNO the flexibility to utilize naval assets in innovative ways to enhance regional deterrence, meet specific combatant commander requirements, including security cooperation activities, multi-carrier fleet exercises, and rotational forward operations while building viable surge capability.

Naval Aviation never has been better prepared to answer the call. With FRP fully instituted, we will possess the ability to respond to future trouble spots around the world with impressive combat power.

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